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In Hermann Hesse's novel Magister Ludi, scholars in 
the future kingdom of Castalia play the Glass Bead Game. 
The players carry the patterns of relationships they 
find in works of art, music, literature, science, 
philosophy, mathematics, and history through patterns of 
transformations, finding joy in the counterpoint of 
expectations met, shattered, and met anew. The novel's 
own counterpoint lies in the thesis and antithesis of 
Castalia and the world, and the search of Joseph Knecht, 
Master of the Game, for the resolving theme. 
We find a similar dialectic in Pitirim Sorokin's 
theory of cultural mentalities. He contrasts the Sensate--
worldly, materialistic, empirical--with the Ideational--
spiritual, realistic, faithful. Each has its virtues 
and its viceso Sorokin does, however, offer us a respite 
from these partial mentalities, in the infrequent 
Idealistic. This variety blends faith and empiricism 
with reason, In my opinion, the Idealistic Mind finds 
its ultimate expression in Spinoza. 
Some time has past since then, and the pendulum has 
gone through its periods once or twice. It seems to me 
that psychology has suffered both from mechanism and 
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scientific spiritualism, as well as from awkward 
combinations. Although the e~tremes have contributed to 
understanding and will continue to do so, they suffer in 
their effectiveness by splitting the scientist. This 
thesis is a small attempt at rejoining the objective and 
the subjective, the secular and the spiritual, the mind 
and the body, an attempt at mending at least one scientist. 
Whether or not it is successful is left to the judgement 
of the reader. If nothing elseg I hope it brings the 
possibility of this Idealistic alternative to the attention 
of a better mind than mine. 
My deepest thanks go to Dr. Helm, Dr. Rambo, and 
Dr. Hochhaus, for having encouraged me in this endeavor; 
to my parents, George and Eberdina Boeree, for their 
sustaining pride; and especially to my wife Judith and 
daughter Jennifer, for their patience and love. 
Nobis semper sit amor, 
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Pious thinkers of earlier times had represented 
the life of creatures, say, as a mode of motion 
toward God, and had considered that the variety 
of the phenomenal world reached perfection and 
ultimate cognition only in the divine Unity. 
Similarly, the symbols and formulas of the Glass 
Bead Game combined structurally, musically, and 
philosophically within the framework of a 
universal language, were nourished by all the 
sciences and arts, and strove in play to 
perfection, pure being, the fullness of reality. 
Thus, "realizing" was a favorite expression 
among the players. They considered their Games 
a path from Becoming to Being, from potentiality 
to reality (Hesse, 1969, pp. JO-Jl). 
More than anything else, this may be said to be the 
age of specialization. We need not beat our breasts--
specialization is (in part) only the recognition of our 
limitations. But there is a danger: that we do not know 
enough beyond our fields of interest to progress within 
them. We have begun, in the last few years, to look at 
our ignorance and our assumptions. This comes as a 
reaction to a professional malaise: We seem to be 
progressing at a far slower rate than was predicted only 
decades ago; Society is demanding relevance, with all its 
definitional variations, from the social sciences; The 
ethics of experimentation on people are being scrutinized; 
The possibility of ever understanding human beings is 
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being questioned. 
Self-examination by social psychologists is bound to 
generate heated debate: Perceptions of what lies behind 
our problems range from lack of rigor in traditional 
research (e.g. Schlenker, 1974) to the inapplicability of 
traditional research methods to human problems (e.g. 
Gergen, 1973). Common solutions to this vague problem 
include greater attention to the environment (Altman, 
1976; Secord, 1976), greater attention to the individual 
(Gadlin and Angle, 1975; Rychlak, 1976), interdisciplinary 
work (Altman, 1976; Mancuso, 1976; Secord, 1976), cross-
cultural work (Gadlin and Angle, 1975; Secord 1976), 
increased use of observational techniques (Altman, 1976; 
McGuire, 1973; Secord, 1976), increased rigor in 
experimental techniques (Schlenker, 1974), putting our 
theories and hypotheses into mathematical form (Harris, 
1974, 1976), and so on ad libitum. 
Seldom, however, is it considered that perhaps our 
basic orientation, our very "world-view," is inappropriate 
to the subject of our concern: Gergen (1973) suggests 
that social psychology is an historical study rather 
than a science concerned with universal laws of behavior; 
Harre and Secord (1973) offer a world-view based (roughly) 
on Kant rather than positivism; and I can only applaud 
their efforts. But we must go further than just 
replacing one world-view with another. So long have we 
trusted to Kuhn's (1970) analysis of the paradigmatic 
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and the pre-paradigmatic that we assume that our science 
must progress in the manner he has proposed. I suggest an 
alternative: that we generate a number of "paradigms"--
world-views--and that these be used in a spirit of 
cooperation rather than competition. Reality is big 
enough to be open to many views, not one of which is 
entirely correct or entirely incorrect. 
This is by no means an easy task. Yes, we all, 
implicitly or explicitly, carry around world-views. But 
rarely are these casual world-views both extensive and 
internally consistent. And every world-view carries with 
it theory, models, methods, and metaphysics, each 
dependent on the others" And any good world-view, insofar 
as it concerns human beings and the thoughts they have, 
must be able to.include itself--i.e. must be capable of 
reflexivity. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a 
world-view must satisfy the aesthetic instincts of the 
individual scientist. This is the final test of any 
world-view, To generate one such world-view is the 
perhaps absurdly ambitious task of the present papera 
Defining Terms 
Let me outline the task by presenting a number of 
words as I understand thema Science is organized 
knowledge; it is valuable inasmuch as we perceive the 
world by interpreting what we sense in terms of our own 
structures, and so the measure of our organization is the 
3 
measure of our ability to handle the complexities of 
living in reality. Science is not equivalent to the 
methods used by scientists: Observation and 
experimentation, the formation and testing of hypotheses, 
are hardly restricted to the scientist, or perhaps even 
to the human beingo The difference between the scientist 
and the non-scientist lies in the care which the former 
takes (or should take) in making his observations and 
experimentso I mention this only so that we realize from 
the start that there is no debate over whether or not 
psychology is a science, or whether or not human beings 
should be "subject" to scientific study. As much as we 
all study people carefully, so much are we all scientists. 
For the purposes of this thesis, metaphysics is the 
set of assumptions which one finds to be irreducible and 
from which one can deduce the range of possibilities one 
expects to find in experience. As traditional psychology 
is based on positivism and its forebearer·s, and Harre and 
Secord's model is based on Kant, so the metaphysics here 
presented finds its roots in the spirit (if not the 
letter) of Spinoza. 
A theory gives explanatory significance to our 
observations, always within the range defined by our 
metaphysics, It is a tool to be used to guide further 
inquiry, It is open to constant modifica-ti·on and even 
replacement. 
A model is the means by which we go from theory to 
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method. A model is an explicit and systematic analogy, 
drawn from theory, which atte~pts to match reality, not 
in the essence· of its workings but in its consequences. 
Care must be taken not to confuse the metaphors of the 
model with those of the theory: The latter are far more 
"serious" than the former, and far less manipulatable, 
At last, .we come to method. Although it sits at the 
"bottom" of our world-view, it is possible the cause of 
more argument in psychology than metaphysics, theories, 
and models combined, I suggest this is so because it 
contains within itself our metaphysics, theories, and 
models, yet often turns about and questions the roots 
from which it grewo It has been impressed upon me that 
the best method is the formal laboratory experiment, that 
this method is the one which all others can only 
approximate in effectiveness. The reasons for believing 
this are well known and need no review here. And so it 
is likely that the portion of this paper which will be 
subject to most criticism is the one on methods: I 
believe that the most basic method is one wherein the 




Theory grows from the confluence of what we see--
our empirical data--and what we believe--our metaphysical 
assumptions. To attempt a theory without empiricism is 
to expound·dogma without touching life in the world; To 
attempt a theory without metaphysics is to list 
observations without giving them meaning. Although it has 
been popular in this century to denounce metaphysical 
speculation as lacking utility, it can hardly be denied 
that we all make very basic assumptions about the world, 
assumptions that may not be.testable in any empirical 
sense. If all I believe is that I experience reality 
veridically, or that my intuitions are sound, or that 
what has worked before must work again, or that reality 
is lawful, I am holding to a metaphysics indescribably 
complex. Not stating our assumptions will not magically 
make us objective observers of the world: Our assumptions 
shine through every observation we make, every word we 
utter. 
As I became aware of my discomfort with traditional 
psychology, I also became aware that my metaphysics was 
rather different from others I had been exposed to, 
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and that this difference might lie at the root of my 
discomfort. The purpose of tnis section is to elucidate, 
not all my assumptions (that task is far beyond the scope 
of this paper), but those at variance with the generally 
accepted metaphysics. 
1. The universe is pluralistic to the infinity of 
detail, so- as .to be indistinguishable from the monistic. 
Like fleas with smaller fleas upon them, things can be 
seen as composed of molecules, the molecules as composed 
of atoms, and so on. Physics is presently detained with 
quarks, but Chinese physicists have already suggested 
stratons--an infinite regression of "atoms," The parts 
need not be solid little building blocks. A chair may be 
thought of as composed of atoms, or waves, or potential 
fields, or even variations of probability: 
If one wants to give an accurate description 
of the elementary particle--and here the 
emphasis is on the word "accurate"--the only 
thing which can be written down is a probability 
function. But then one sees that not even the 
quality of being (if that can be called a 
"quality") belongs to what is being described, 
It is a possibility for being or a tendency for 
being (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 70). 
The principle remains the same: Without an ultimate 
particle, the "grain" of the universe approaches the 
infinitely fine; there are no lines to separate A from B, 
and every thing is a ·.,convenient construct." 
2. Space and time are only aspects of a unitary 
time-space manifold. Consider time as another spatial 
dimension, at right angles to all our other dimensions. 
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We, due to our humble construction, perceive time as 
passing: ·We cannot see through past or future eyes, nor 
-
touch with past or future hands. But think of each 
moment of our view of time as a photo slide, and stack 
them in order. If the films are as thin as the distance 
between the photochemical dots that make up each picture, 
and are fused together to make a solid block, you have a 
.model of space-time: 
Each observer, as his time passes, discovers, 
so to speak, new slices of space-time which 
appear to him as successive aspects of the 
material world, though in reality the ensemble 
of events constituting space-time exists prior 
to his knowledge of them (de Broglie, in Schilpp, 
1959, p. 114). 
Now notice that the photochemical dots between slides 
(i.e. on the time dimension) have the exact same relation 
to each other as the dots within a slide. The difference 
from moment to moment is the same as that from point to 
point. Conceived in this way, the world is determined 
. 
but not causal. What we see as cause-and-effect is the 
structure of the time-space manifold. 
3. Mind and matter, the mental and the physical, are 
only aspects of a unitary aesthetic continuum. "The 
decision of the mind, and the desire and determination of 
the body .. , are one and the same thing" (Spinoza, 1951, 
III, 2)o This position is a familiar one, psychophysical 
parallelism, and it comes in two important species. One 
is Russell's, James', and Dewey's neutral monism and the 
functionalism derived therefrom: Mind is a certain 
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working of the body. The other is Spinoza's, Leibnitz', 
and Bergson's identity theory.and the panpsychism derived 
therefrom: All is conscious. It is this second kind that 
I accepto We don't need to ask "How do I change light 
particles refracting in the atmosphere and exciting 
molecules in my retina into an experience of blue?" These· 
events are blue. And you don't see an image of the sky 
on your retina or anywhere else; You see the sky. 
We may summarize these three assumptions by saying 
that, in essence, there are no things, but only a single, 
holistic structuring of the single form, the time-space 
manifold, the aesthetic continuum. 
4. Finally, we must find a place for man in this 
"buzzing, blooming confusion:" Sentience occurs when 
aesthetic space-time turns inward upon itself, becoming a 
partially independent system so as to be capable of 
interacting with its environs. We are whirlpools in the 
ocean of experience. It is we who separate space and time, 
mind and matter, the parts from the whole. Intransigent 
opposites are created in the minds of men. 
Although it may so appear, this is not just a 
personal perspective, but is closely tied to what Huxley 
called "the perennial philosophy," It is shared by many 
mystics, some physicists, and a few psychologists. And 
assumption of this point of view colors one's entire 
approach to psychology, science, and life. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORY 
(The self) is a drop of the cosmos, and its 
surface tensions bespeak only a fragile and 
indefinite barrier that marks a region of 
relative structuring, relative independence. 
This structuring and independence exist only 
because they are relative, that is, because 
of the confluence of the self and the non-self. 
As the musician melts into and identifies with 
his beloved instrument, the Hopi Indian on the 
rim melts into his Grand Canyon (Murphy, 1966, 
p I 7) I 
The mystic's metaphysics has left us with a nebulous 
image of man indeed! In a sea composed of minute currents 
of experiential relationships--of color and sound, shape 
and weight--all without edges, all frozen into a four-
dimensional block, we discern a pattern, a world-line 
resembling the branching of a tree: Life. This tree has 
partially separated itself from the rest of the ocean by 
having more aesthetic eddies turning in upon itself. Now 
I must admit that this image is more suited for meditation 
than for dealing with the practical problems of being-in-
the-world. A less cloudy metaphor is needed to accomplish 
the transition from metaphysics to a theory of sentience. 
Let us envision our aesthetic continuum as the 
distribution of thermal energy in space. When the heat 
from the sun reaches the earth, the earth absorbs it, but 
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unevenly--depending on the arrangements of sea, land, and 
air. At night, this heat is r:-eleased into the atmosphere, 
again unevenly; ·where it meets and interacts with the 
heat from the sun, to make the weathero The distribution 
of thermal energy on the earth is far more complex than 
that beyond it, and a larger proportion of that 
distribution is involved in relations with itself than 
is involved in relations with the distribution of thermal 
energy beyond the earth. To bring us back to ourselves, 
the sun represents the environment, the earth 
the human being, and the inward-turning distribution of 
thermal energy--roughly, the weather--is reflective 
consciousness. 
A second metaphor: If a land has an irregular 
coastline, its littoral communities tend to form an 
ecosystem separate from the communities farther inland; 
If a land has a regular coastline, the coastal people 
remain tied to those inland, This is thought to be 
because, as the coastline has more bays, coves, capes, 
etc., any particular littoral community is more likely 
to be in contact with other littoral communities than 
with inland communities. In Figure 1, A is in contact 
with three inland and two littoral groups; B is in contact 
with three inland and four littoral groups. If a 
littoral ecosystem is to arise, it is more likely around B 
(McEvedy, 1967), The sentient organism is like a coastal 
·society--differentiated from the great continental empire 
of environment by the greater relationship it has with 
itself. 
Interaction 
There are certainly inputs from and outputs to the 
environment--I will call these sensations and actions. 
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But the complexity of the inward-turning of the organism 
will not usually allow for a simple connection between 
sensation and action. The structuring within rather 
presents itself in anticipation of sensations and actions, 
as the earth displays its oceans and continents, or the 
sea-faring society greets inland traders with a delegation 
whose form derives from the society's economic 
organization. Inasmuch as the presented structuring is 
appropriate, life goes on unchanged. But when the 
anticipation is incorrect, the structuring must adapt 
itself to meet new requirements--like the society must 
change 1tself when the inlanders introduce money or slaves 
into the marketplace. So the organism anticipates the 
environment, adapts to incongruities between its 
anticipations and sensations with further anticipations, 
many of which manifest themselves as actions upon the 
environment, and so on, continuously, fluidly, ever-
presently. This is interaction, and is roughly summarized 
in Figure.2. 
Of course, we are ~ot always reflexive: Occasionally, 
we sink into dreamless sleep or fall "unconscious." And 
B 
Figure 1a Littoral Society 
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occasionally we become almost entirely reflexive, ignoring 
the world while we become engrossed in anticipations 
divorced from sensations and actions--dreaming, thinking, 
remembering, imagining, reflecting. We return to the full 
interaction cycle through the entry points of reflexes and 
those more complex reflexes we call instincts: 
Loud noises, rhythmic repetitions of stimuli, 
sudden visible movements, and painful stimuli 
are examples of signals that we are always ready 
for. Infants are surely born with schemata to 
accept such information, which is used to begin 
new cycles of perceptual activity (Neisser, 
1976, pp. 94-95). 
I mentioned "reflecting." Let me again quote from 
Neiss er (1976) to explain: "Images are not pictures in 
the head, but plans for obtaining information from 
potential environments" (p. 1.31); "Perception is a cyclic 
activity that includes an anticipating phase; imagery is 
anticipation occuring alone" (po 147)" Let me add that 
thinking is anticipation and adaptation: Insofar as our 
structural organizations are never complete, we are able 
to present ourselves with incompatible anticipations, which 
we must "rationalize" by adapting to, 
How do we get objects and acts from sensations and 
actions? I might refer you to the work of J, J. Gibson 
(1966), but let us see if we can be more succinct: An 
object is a collection of sensations interrelated in such 
a way that to anticipate one part of it is to anticipate 
all of it. While the potential relationships the object 
has outside itself are potentially infinite, the 
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relationships within remain (more or less) constant and so 
are anticipatable as a whole. Likewise, an act is the set 
of actions which an anticipation generates together, e.g. 
certain muscle groups functioning cooperatively. In even 
more succinct terms, objects and acts are gestaltso 
Often enough, though, we impose "gestalting" on 
collections of these gestalts: While individual finger 
movements may be proper acts, the bar of music we play on 
the piano has an integrity beyond muscle coordination. 
This is the same as saying that we are capable of 
anticipating sets of anticipations, of forming simple acts 
and objects into unified wholes by applying rules to them, 
In this manner we provide a larger context for various 
events in our lives; we give meaning to the meaningless. 
Learning, beyond the simple connection between an 
object and an act, is then the associating of a gestalt or 
gestalting with a place on a higher level of gestalting. 
Many writers speak of .learning as the creation of 
metaphors. When a new event can be substituted into an 
old pattern, we have a metaphor. So in our formulation of 
adaptation, we accomplish metaphors as we accomplish 
associations: When an anticipation is unsuccessful, we 
must try and try again, "acting" (if by acting we mean 
anticipation as well as action) on the situation until we 
can anticipate successfully, building with old structures a 
new structure capable of dealing with the new event. 
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Affect 
This interactional process we have been discussing is 
not, however, "transcendental"--it grows from biological 
roots, While to some extent we can regard the individual's 
physical presence as just another set of environmental 
events, evolution has provided modelating relationships 
between the "somatic environment" and the interaction 
process, no doubt in the interest of survival. 
As I mentioned before, we must at least occasionally 
attend to the world, and so are provided with inborn 
structuring--instincts and reflexes. We react, we orient 
ourselves, we hunger, we thirst, we seek sexual activity. 
Perhaps we also defend, attack, seek the company of others, 
and so on. These are no different than the structures 
we learn--we just don't lea~n them, But learning is one 
of the strongest survival mechanisms around, and it 
appears we are driven to learn far beyond our immediate 
needs. Why? 
When we are hungry and we eat, we feel pleasure, 
A structure within us is "incomplete," and as we complete 
it, we enjoy the act. When we are satiated, the pleasure 
draws to a close, and we wait until the structure "breaks 
down" once more, Pleasure is in the approaching. We 
also feel irritation: The longer a structure remains 
incomplete, the greater is our irritation. 
I suggest that this same phenomenon occurs on a more 
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cognitive level. Adaptation--the increasing of structure--
is directly perceived as pleasure, ranging from mild 
effectance to the "Eureka" experience. Likewise, as 
anticipation is frustrated, we experience irritation, 
ranging from mild annoyance to terror. Besides being 
direct experiences of our "states of mind," we also 
perceive reflections of pleasure and irritation in the 
variations of tension in the somatic environment. 
Individual, personal consciousness is the weaving of 
loose threads: Our experience of consciousness lies in 
growth and the need to grow, in the interactions where we 
find anticipation-and-adaptation. ·so, consciousness 
occurs only in conjunction with the pleasure-irritation 
dichotomy discussed above, or, more correctly, is 
identical with the experience of pleasure and irritation. 
Unconsciousness lies in interaction wherein adaptation 
is absento Consciousness and unconsciousness so defined 
place this theory squarely in the existentialist camp: 
Without the pains and pleasures of being-in-the-world, we 
are automatons; Growth is equivalent to consciousness. 
Attending and ignoring are complementary: They 
are anticipatory "acts" which draw an event from the 
background of experience into consciousness, or push an 
event into that background. "To pick one apple from a 
tree you need not filter out all the others; you just 
don't pick them" (Neisser, 1976, Po 85), In the proverbial 
crowded bar, we attend to the semantics of our friend's 
conversation. We certainly anticipate the sounds and 
syntax of our friend's sentences--if he were to start 
speaking Russian, we would surely notice. And certainly 
we anticipate the existence of noise and other 
conversations all around us--if it were to suddenly 
become quiet, we would again surely notice. One can 
ignore the sense of a conversation by anticipating the 
sounds of that conversation consciously. Or one can 
attend to the "sense" of a familiar object or act by 
searching for its anomalies, by making it unfamiliar, 
by analyzing it. When an event is attended to, we are 
conscious of it; when it is ignored, we are not conscious 
of ito But an event more often enters consciousness of 
itself, without the effort of attending, by being what 
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we do not know; and an event more often recedes into 
unconsciousness, without the effort of ignoring, by being 
what we knowo 
"Clouds of spinning atoms" may give a chemist a 
fairly concrete image of the reality he must work with, 
but this image will not help him greatly in "doing" 
chemistry. We must now (for a while) leave the realm of 
poetry and try to develop a model of mind which we can 
manipulate, with which we can "do" psychology. We must 
map the currents and eddies of experience. 
CHAPTER IV 
MODEL 
In the preceding sections, we have seen a portion 
of the experiential world pull itself away from the rest 
and establish partial autonomy, We who are part of this 
autonomous portion interact with the world by anticipating, 
as best we can, what the world presents to us. Success 
in this endeavor means survival. Success means we have 
within us a model--a map, never fully accurate, always 
developing--of the world and our relations with the world. 
The purpose of the following sections is, in turn, to 
develop a model of these models, Science is, perhaps, 
the art of making better maps. Psychology has a very 
central role in science in that it attempts, in essence, 
to map the map-maker, 
Networks 
We could represent our neurological apparatus at any 
moment in time with interconnect~ng strings and knots 
of string, the signals traveling over this network as tiny 
nodules sitting on the string. With time, the strings and 
knots extend into the fourth dimension as planes, and the 
signals as ridges on these planes. Other possible models 
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of the central nervous system include electronic, 
hydraulic, and mechanical systems, information processing 
systems, and postulated "pseudoneuron" and "neuronidae" 
systems (e.g. Culbertson, 1963). Let us, however, remain 
with the "knit sweater," since it has so few "parts:" This 
image is particularly appropriate as a map of those 
currents and eddies that are the experiential aspect of 
the nervous system. 
"(A) totality does not consist of things but of 
relationships" (Hjelmslev, 1961, pp. 22-23), With this 
inspiration, Sidney Lamb invented a network notation for 
linguistic systems quite congenial to our image of man. 
Unlike other models dealing with "information" (i.e. 
experience), nothing processes the information. Minute 
"currents'' split in two, come together, halt the progress 
of other currents, or turn about on themselves like the 
tides. 
The notation consists of a network of lines connected 
by a number of nodes. The lines are thought of as 
transmitting signals in either direction. The nodes are 
"triggered" by one or more incoming signals, then send out 
signals in a pattern defined by the type of node: 
1. And node: a 
If a, then b and c; ~ 
If b and c, then a. b c 
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2. Or node: a 
If' a, then b and Cj 7v. 
If' b, then a; b c 
If' c, then a. 
3. And or node: a 
b~'c If' a, then b and c; If' b, then a; 
If' c, then a; 
If' b and c, then a. 
4. Triangle node: a 
A If' a, then b· ' 
If' b, then c; b c 
If' c, then a. 
5. Circle node: 
If' a, then b and Cj a 
If' b, then a and c; A 
If' c, then a and b. b c 
6. T node: a 
If' b, then a and ON; f:. 
If' c, then a and OFF; b c 
If' a and ON, then b; 
If' a and OFF, then c. 
7, Zero node: 
If a, then nothing, 
a 
b 
8. Tactics node: 
If a, then a, 
9 
a 
9, R-set node: t 
If t, then r and t. ~ 
r 
10. s--set node: s 
If t and OFF, then ON;. ~t 
If s and ON, then t and OFF; 
If t and ON, then OFF. 
11. Diamond node: a t 
If t and OFF, then· ON; <2(b 
If a and ON, then b and t and OFF; 
If b and ON, then a and t and OFF; 
If t and ON, then OFF, 
Acy other inputs to these nodes results in no output at 
all. Please note that these are my interpretations of 
Lamb's nodes and are slightly different. They remain 
true, however, to their inventor's intentions. 
This small set of nodes, used properly, has an 
enormous descriptive range. The interested reader may 
wish to examine the following simple examples, Figures 3 
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through 7, included here as a testament to this rangeo 
In all these diagrams, there are "loose ends," lines 
with three dots and a word or description. A more 
complete diagram would have (after further developments 
replacing the three dots) diamond or set nodes, relating 
the structure diagrammed to the rest of cognitive 
structure or to the subjective environment. The sum of -----
all _§uch nodes that are active ("ON") at .§..!1Y. point in 
time represents anticipation. Adaptation, in turn, is the 
establishment of new nodes, or, more precisely, the 
functional differentiation of nodes which are already 
(implicitly) in intermediate positions throughout the 
network. 
Before I am accused of being a simplistic mechanist, 
allow me to point out the limitations of the network 
notation for you: 
1. The network is a representation of only a portion 
of a completely interacting whole. The division of the 
individual from his environment is an artificiality we 
must live with, and is to some extent justified by the 
fact that we ourselves make that distinction 
phenomenologically (to a large degree, anyway), But the 
artificialities of taxonomy-rule-narrative distinctions 
and even the choices of convenient nodes are far more 
difficult to justify. And the artificialities of 
subdividing the individual into (e.g.) morality, person-


























Figure 3, A Portion of Tzeltal Ethnobotany (derived from 
Berlin~ Breedlove, and Raven, 1970) 
woody 
deciduous 
has acorns ... 









Figure 4. A Portion of a Western Ethnobotany (adapted 
























B ,j ine ,j 
Seniority of generation (senior, same, junior). 
Sex of relative (male or female). 
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Symmetry of relationship to connecting matrilineal 
group (symmetrical or assymmetrical). 
Sex relative to ego's sex (same or different). 
Mode of relationship (affinal or consanguinal). 
Age relative to ego's age (older or younger). 
Matrilineal group membership relative to ego's 
(ego's, ego's father's, neither). 
Collateral remove (lineal or non-lineal). 
F pwiij K pwy_nywe,j 
G feefinej L jaaj mwaan 
c semenapej_ H mwaani M mwaaninyki 
D jinen~ I mwege ,je ,j N neji 
E ,j ine ,j ,i iseme j J jeesej 






















Swing and miss 
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A Partial Analysis of the Rules of Baseball 





have already this moment 
had reason sufficiently 
had a 
perception of 









"I have already had reason to say that Isabel knew her 
husband to be djspleased by the continuance of Ralph's 
visit to Romeo That knowledge was very present to her as 
she went to her cousin's hotel the day after she had 
invited Lord Warburton to give a tangible proof of his 
sincerity; and at this moment, as at others, she had a 
sufficient perception of the sources of Osmond's 
opposition." (Henry James, 1909, p. 245) 
Figure 7, Narrative Analysis 
only in terms of our limitations, 
2. The network is a slice of time-space, a 
representation of a portion of so~eone's structure at a 
point in time. It misses the constant adaptation of the 
individual to the environment (and to himself). A great 
part of daily experience is not prescribed by one's 
structure, is not set down in rules, but must be dealt 
with through the metaphorizing of anticipation-and-
adaptation, Even if our network were complete, we are 
not dealing with the individual as incomplete, ever 
growing, ever developing. 
J, Finally, network notation (like logic, 
mathematics, and so on) is itself a manifestation of 
human structure, and so--this is quite obvious--is itself 
growing, changing, adapting. Like all things human, the 
elements of notation are ch6sen, the rules defined. 
Insofar as we abide by these choices, a logical system 
is universal (in the philosophical sense), But--given 
the metaphysics here assumed--it is inevitable that an 
event occur for which no contingency is planned. 
In defense, I might add that any system of science, 
philosophy, or mathematics, or work of art or literature, 
has these very same drawbacks. The works of, say, 
Voltaire may be complete unto themselves; But they are 
not Voltaire. We model creations, not creation itself, 
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Language 
Language may serve as a paradigmatic form of much 
of the rest of our cognitive structuring: 1. Language 
is a generative system--it is capable of generating (or 
accepting) an infinite number of events with the use of a 
finite number of parts; 2. Language is a parallel 
system--it connects interactions involving a relatively 
small set of gestalts (the sounds of a language) with 
interactio~E involving a broad set of gestalts (the 
events one describes or imagines, both of which proceed 
simultaneously; Jo Language is partially independent of 
the rest of our structuring, similar to the way we are 
partially independent of our environmento 
Considering its complexity, if we can model language 
with a network, we have gone a long way toward 
demonstrating the efficacy of the network as a model 
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of the totality of our cognitive structuring. It is, of 
course, precisely this which occupies the stratificational 
linguistics that developed from Lamb's initiatives. 
Stratificational linguistics views language as 
several strata of systems, each of which is relatively 
independento Six strata are recognized: On "top" is 
the hypersememic (a.k.a. semantemic, a.k.a. gnosemic) 
stratum, which deals with substance; On "bottom" is the 
hypophonemic (or phonetemic) stratum, which deals with 
articulation; Between these we find, from top to bottom, 
the sememic, lexemic, morphemic, and phonemic strata. 
This arrangement is paralleled by Leech (1974), who 
proposes a deep and surface level of semantics, syntax, 
and phonology (with somewhat more traditional 
interpretations)o 
A strata is defined by a tactics portion acting 
on a realization portion which provides structural 
relations with the strata above and below. Leech again 
parallels nicely: He distinguishes (in discussing 
semantics) between contrastiveness as the "paradigmatic" 
or selectional axis (essentially componential analysis) 
and constituent structure as the "syntagmatic" or 
combinatory axis (like the traditional tree diagrams). 
This distinction is the same as that made between 
realization and tactics respectively. 
To give you a flavor of the different strata, 
here are a few English examples: 1. On the hypophonemic 
stratum, a bilabial voiced plosive ("b") or a labiodental 
voiced fricative ("v") is acceptable, but a bilabial 
voiced fricative (such as the Spanish "v" in "Havana") 
.30 . 
is not; 2. On the phonemic stratum, "slithy toves" is 
acceptable, but "shtroogeh psokshi" is not; J. On the 
morphemic stratum, "supercalifragilistic" is acceptable, 
but "hoodmother" is not; 4. On the lexemic stratum, 
"colorless green ideas slept furiously" is acceptable, but 
"dog the house the of out kick" is not; 5. On the sememic 
level, "he put out the sun" is acceptable, but "he put it 
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from the car" is not; 6. On the hypersememic level, "he 
is his mother's son" is acceptable, but "he is his 
mother's father" is not. 
To give you a flavor of the relationship of tactics 
and realization, here .is an example adapted from Lockwood 
(1973)' who examines the inflexional morphemes of Latin. 
"Forest" in Latin varies depending on the use the word is 
put to: 
Nominative singular--silva 
Genitive singular-- silvae 
Dative singular-- silvae 
Accusative singular--silvam 
Ablative singular-- silva ----
Nominative plural-- silvae 
Genitive plural-- silvarum 
Dative plural-- silvis 
Accusative plural-- silvas 
Ablative plural-- silvis 
Other words vary likewise, but the change in endings 
depends on what class the word belongs to. The analysis 
results in Figure 8. (Note that at the phonemic level, 
a-i becomes ae, a: becomes a, a-i:s becomes is, and so on.·) 
The connection of the interaction experience and 
the semantic levels of language is accomplished through 
the association of the components of the semantic levels 
with various episteme~: 




silva oculus navis nom. gen. dat. acc. abl. sing. plur. 
Realization (alternation pattern for inflexional lexons) 







Figure Bo Lexotactics, Realization, and Morphotactics 
(adapted from Lockwood, 1973) 
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have integrity for the individual, i.e. objects and acts 
(e.g. John Smith, my walking, etc.), 
2. Relations--the acts (or anticipations) the 
individual must perform to perceive (or do) more than one 
gestalt fully (e.g. he is next to that tree). 
3, Aspects--that which is abstracted from a gestalt 
by an act (or anticipation), and which the gestalt shares 
with other gestalts inasmuch as the act (or anticipation) 
can be performed on them as well. 
a. Modal aspects--that which is abstracted by 
a restriction of the sensory mode (e.g. green), 
b, Temporal aspects--that which is abstracted 
by a restriction of the time over which the gestalt 
is dealt with (e.g. waving). 
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c. Spatial aspects--that which is abstracted by 
a restriction of the spatial range over which the 
gestalt is dealt with (e.g. nose). 
So, what we have called components are essentially "named" 
epistemes. 
left like this, language is a complex but somewhat 
mechanical translation system, What gives it life is the 
input from past experience. The very simplest presentation 
of this is the narrative: It consists of predications 
arranged hierarchically by means of the explicit or 
implicit relations between predications (e.g. conjunctions, 
causal connections, time spans, etc.), as illustrated 
earlier in Figure 7, The "components" of this narrative 
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network (the circle nodes) connect to the taxonomies which 
tie epistemes to the formal layers of language, as in 
Figure 9, The narrative is, of course, a story--the 
barest bones of a full representation of our past 
experience. But the difference is a matter of the degree 
to which we fill in the details. 
Semantics 
The network diagrams are an effort to keep us firmly 
connected to the images of this metaphysics and theory, and 
language makes a nice demonstration of the descriptive 
power of the network. But language is more than just this: 
It is man's primordial logic, his most efficient means of 
manipulating events when reality itself cannot be 
manipulated. 
Geoffrey Leech (1969, 1974) offers us an analysis of 
semantics as a system of logic. First, semantics operates 
with a number of components of various species: 
1. Binary taxonorny--"alive" (+LIVE)/"dead" (-LIVE), 
"human" (+HUMAN) /"non-human" (-HUMAN); 
2. Multiple taxonomy--"gold" (alVIETAL)/"copper" 
( blVIETAL) /"iron" ( clVIETAL) /. , , ; 
3, Polar oppositions--"large" (+'SIZE)/"small" 
(-'SIZE); 
4. Relative opposition--"parent of,.," (+:PARENT)/ 
"child of,,," (-:PARENT), "own"/"belong", "over"/"under", 












Figure 9. The Interaction of Narrative and Taxonomy 
5, Hierarchy--"inch" (lLENGTH)/"foot" (2LENGTH)/ 
"yard" (JLENGTH)/, .. , "Monday"/"Tuesday"/"Wednesday"/, .. ; 
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6, Inverse opposi tion--"possible" (+"POSSIBLE)/ 
"necessary" (-"POSSIBLE), "allow"/" compel", "willingness"/ 
"insistence", "become"/" stay", "universal all"/ 
"existential some". 
Note that we might reduce these to two forms: The binary 
taxonomy could be considered a limited form of the 
multiple taxonomy; the polar opposition could be considered 
a relative opposition wherein one argument is "understood" 
(e.g. "he is small" as "he is smaller than most people"); 
the hierarchy is a taxonomy which contains an implicit 
opposition; and the inverse oppos~tion is an opposition 
which contains another, implicit, opposition. 
Secondly, we gather our components into clusters: 
+HUMAN +MALE +ADULT is the argument "man" and +:DIRECTION 
+PRIMARY is the predicate "in front of," Then we arrange 
our clusters into predications: "The man (+DEFINITE 
+HUMAN +MALE +ADULT -PLURAL) was in front of (+:DIRECTION 
+PRIMARY +PAST) the woman {+DEFINITE +HUMAN -MALE +ADULT 
-PLURAL);" "Alsatians (aBREED +PLURAL) are large (+'SIZE 
-PAST);" "It's raining (+RAIN)," These examples, 
incidently, also exemplify the three types of predication: 
two-place (or relational), one-place (or attributive), 
and zero-place predications respectively. 
Thirdly, we have the relationships between 
predications, the logic of correct semantic 
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transformations. Note that, as Leech himself acknowledges, 
transformations disappear when put into network form; 
however, most of our thinking and our verbal expressions 
themselves are linear and transformations are essential 
when linearity is adhered to. 
The rule of entailment states that "a relation of ---
entailment arises between two assertions whenever (the 
assertions being otherwise identical) an argument or 
predicate in one assertion is pyponymous to an argument 
or predicate in the other" (Leech, 1974, p. 137). 
Hyponymy (or "meaning inclusion") is that situation where 
one cluster of components includes another. So "I saw 
a woman" entails "I saw an adult," and "I stole a horse" 
entails "I took a horse." 
The rule of inconsistency states that "a relation 
of inconsistency arises between two assertions whenever 
(the assertions being otherwise identical) the predicate 
of one is incompatible with that of the other" (Leech, 
1974, p. 137)0 Incompatibility is the presence of 
mutually exclusive components. So, "Mary dislikes work" 
is inconsistent with "Mary likes work," and "This is red" 
is inconsistent with "This is blue." 
As part of these rules of transformation, we must be 
aware of certain semantic anomalies: Null arguments--
e,g, "The dinner was cooked (by someone)" or "John is 
eating (something)"--are superordinate to all other sets 
of components because they contain no features. So 
"John eats nuts" entails "John eats." Selectional 
restrictions must also be allowed for: Often a predicate 
depends on a particular feature in one of the arguments. 
"The horse owns the man" seems incorrect because owns 
depends on a +HUMAN in the initial argument, 
Further complications arise with embedding and 
down-grading predications, Embedding is using a 
predication as an argument in another predication: "John 
angers Bill" = "John makes Bill angry" = "John causes 
(Bill is angry)o" Downgrading is using a predication as 
a feature: "A bewigged man". = "A man with a wig" = "A 
man (who was wearing a wig)." 
Fourthly and finally, we have the logic of what 
Leech calls formators: "Roughly: features of meaning 
whose function is purely internal to the linguistic, i.e. 
logical, system~ (Leech, 1974, p. 161). This definition 
includes "not", "and", "or", "the", "some", and "all" 
(or at least their non-referential components), 
It is from this stuff--ordinary language--that the 
great systems of "formal logic" were essentially derived, 
and with which they will always be judged. 
Sound is easily detached from its source, and 
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easily intrudes into other events; a creature with good 
hearing, flexible vocal apparatus, and a brain capable of 
generativity, would find this peculiarity of sound a 
great aid to survival. Language is a practical compromise 
between presenting others with a fully detailed 
reproduction of an event and not presenting 
them with anything at all. We attempt to extract 
generalities from an uncertain world in order that we 
may lessen these uncertainties for ourselves and others. 
Language is a model of reality. 
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We have discussed the "formal" model of the network, 
and the "casual" model of everyday semantics. Let us now 
go on to how we go about arriving at a description at all. 
CHAPTER V 
METHOD 
A society's culture consists of whatever it is 
one has to know or believe in order to operate 
in a manner acceptable to its members, and to 
do so in any role they accept for any one of 
themselves. o , • It is the forms of things 
that people have in mind, their models for 
perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting 
them (Goodenough, 1957, PPo 167-168), 
We can see that a large part of a person's life in 
the world, in his society, or even in his own mind, is a 
matter of skillso Although most of these skills operate· 
quite unconsciously, still we must attempt to allow the 
people in whom we are interested to themselves provide the 
terms of the descriptions of their skills. With care, I 
believe, these skills may be brought to light. 
Imagine a world consisting of a crystalline forest. 
Billions of crystals form, grow, break, and form anew. 
Each crystal, although bearing some resemblance to other 
crystals, is unique. The reason for this uniqueness is 
that each crystal grows in a pattern determined by the 
images falling on its surface, including the images of its 
fellow crystals and the reflections from their surfaces 
of itself and others. If you wish to study these 
crystals, by all means do so; But keep in mind that the 
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very act of observing them contributes to their uniqueness. 
Certainly, we can go a level-of-analysis down, 
where, presumably, this "uniqueness principle" is less 
pervasive, We may even be able to predict and control 
events at this level, and perhaps explain what happens at 
our original level. But, beyond the set of axioms we 
might derive as defining "being crystalline," the crystals 
themselves remain unique and cannot be used to discover 
further laws. The social-psychology of these our fabulous 
crystals is an historical science. 
How does the unfortunate social psychologist then 
deal with his subject matter and get it down on paper? 
One way is to derive from your theory an hypothesis, 
define your operations, manipulate two or more groups 
differentially, and statistically examine the results. 
But this method was designed to produce law, and is 
inappropriate in direct proportion to the generativity 
(historicity) of the subject matter. 
Those more aware of historicity have been forced 
(often under protest) to use observational methods. In 
the theory here presented, however, the legitimacy of 
observation is upheld as allowing for the description of 
the decisions the observer uses in anticipating the 
generative creatures he observes. The resulting 
description can be tested by being used by others to 
anticipate within the same or similar events. And it may 
be replicated by another scientist and the descriptions 
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comparedo 
The danger of observation lies in the fact that an 
error might not be discovered until well after the 
possibly long and arduous field study is completed--if at 
all. A single component absent during the period of 
observation may make the resulting description applicable 
to only some specific events (for example, "when dealing 
with out::?iders")o Although we may attempt to cover for 
this prospect by purposely seeking deviant events, in 
general non-experimental methods suffer in effectiveness 
when used in the "do-then-analyze" manner of the 
experimento 
One solution requires that we test our anticipations 
repeatedly during our observation. Even better, we might 
test our anticipations continually, throughout our 
observation by allowing them to become acts. This is 
called passing. 
Just about anyone who has moved from one culture 
to another, given sufficient time, will learn enough about 
the new culture to pass as a native (or a reasonable 
facsimile thereof). As we all know, children are 
especially adept at this. Some members of socially 
defined minorities spend half their days in their own 
culture and half in the dominant cultureo Transvestites 
and, even more dramatically, transsexuals are quite capable 
of passing as a member of the opposite sex. Actors present 
us with convincing imitations of people, cultures, moods, 
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and so on. Forgers make their livings painting as if 
they were Rembrandt, Picasso, or Renoir. Impressionists 
go so far as to "pass;" however briefly, as individual 
celebrities. In passing, the scientist need only remember 
to write down how he does it. 
Unfortunately, society makes certain demands of us, 
and we are seldom allowed_ the pleasures of spending the 
necessary amounts of time on a specific culture, group, 
or individual. So we must often turn to abbreviated 
methods: 
1. As I have already mentioned, we can forego the 
continuous growth of passing and instead record the 
decisions we make in anticipating (i.e. we can observe). 
2. We can study what we already know, i. e, we can 
introspect about our own lives, societies, and cultures--
risking the errors of idiosyncrasy (who will dare test our 
descriptions?) and blocking (we must force ourselves to be 
aware of what we already know). 
3. We can narrow our range, from complex, intact, 
long-term events to simple, isolated, short-term events--
possibly ignoring the contributions of context. 
4. We can withdraw from subjects and events, going 
from., say, participant-observation to double-blinds, 
recorded instructions, and tachystoscopes--risking 
mistaking the lack of resolution contributed by distance 
for error. 
5, We can increase the occurance of some event by 
manipulation, for example by presenting subjects with 
anomolous events (as in Garfinkling), or by controlling 
extraneous stimuli (as in the laboratory)--possibly 
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
6. We can rely on "secondary sources"--verbal or 
written material such as biographies, speeches, etc,--
with the simple risk that what people say may not be 
what they mean. 
7, We may ask our subjects for the decisions they 
make, allowing them to do our work for us, as we do in 
ethnoscience and interviews, as well as questionnaires 
and surveys--risking misunderstanding, rationalizations, 
and over-attention to idiosyncrasies, 
Please note that each simplication has its 
justifications, and only God knows when we lose more than 
we learn, But I do make one heretical point: "The 
Experimental Method" is just one of a large number of 
less-than-perfect methods; And passing and other 
qualitative methods are not weak imitators of laboratory 
experimentation, but rather methods appropriate to the 
historical nature of human experience. 
Historicity isn't discontinuous with the mechanistic 
viewpoint: The greater the number of variables, the 
broader the chunk of space-time, the deeper the layers of 
stratons you need to take into account in order to predict 
and control within a certain probability range, the more 
you are dealing with historicity. The traditional 
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conception of scientific methodology does not hold up 
well when things get too small, too large, or too complex. 
In passing, there is no attempt to Understand, Explain, 
Predict, and Control in the sense that these are thought 
of as "something special." Instead, passing aims at 
understanding, explaining, predicting, and controlling 
as we do in day-to-day life, that is, as anticipation-
sensation-adaptation-and-action. By growing towards 
comprehension, rather than arriving at lawfulness, thus 
do we handle our historicity, 
CHAPTER VI 
IN THE WORLD 
Although the preceding chapters may occasionally 
suggest a concatenation of nonsequiturs, I hope the 
essentially visual image that underlies the less fluid 
verbal description has been made clear. But, rather than 
apologize for my short-comings, allow me to introduce the 
following sections, concerning the realization of these 
often airy abstractions upon the real world. In the form 
of a series of excerpts from a fictional diary, each piece 
is intended to exemplify portions of earlier chapters. 
The comments which follow go on to briefly indicate 
positions on various general issues as they derive from 
the "glass beads" world-view. 
Beginnings 
The rain came sheeting down, turning the lush green 
jungle into corrugated cardboard. Each step was a matter 
of pulling a foot smacking from the mud. I trudged on in 
the direction I had been taking since being left off at 
the river dock some two hours ago. Close to dispairing of 
ever finding the Monara village, nothing could have pleased 
me more than when I heard the continuous resounding of 
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pistol shots: The rain hitting bamboo roofingo Seemingly 
hours later, I was face-to-face with bamboo wall gently 
curving away in either direction. I randomly chose one 
and followed the wall, listening to the chatter of children 
within. Suddenly, the wall ended and I stumbled into that 
single circular hut that was the village of Monarakombei. 
The villagers had been conversing under the roof 
extending from the outside wall, loudly so as to be heard 
above the downpour. But with my entrance, a hush spread 
around the 400 foot diameter circle like a wave. Some 
boys who had been wrestling in the mud of the centrai 
commons scurried to the shelter of their respective 
families' segments of the village. The heads-of-households 
left their hammocks, collected their machetes, and slowly 
moved into the rain, toward the intruder at the open gate, 
Pulling myself somewhat unsurely together, I fidgeted in 
my sopping pockets for my flashlight. When I had it in 
hand, I straightened into the "posture of strength" I had 
learned from the town guides, and played the light around 
the commons. The townspeople who occasionally traded with 
the Monara had long ago learned that, unless a stranger 
demonstrate that he had tiganaia--"power"--his strangeness 
would make him akaimonara--a non-human in human shape, a 
demon, an object to be freely disposed of. 
As uncertain of how to deal with me as I was of them, 
they scrupulously avoided dealing with me at all, even in 
making eye contact, Instead they concentrated on the 
flashiight that had quickly left my fingers, Other than 
those trade goods--machetes, knives, iron pots, and the 
like--that they traded skins, feathers, and exotic 
foodstuffs for, the Monara rarely see anything so exotic 
as a flashlight. 
Some began walking back to their homes; others were 
rapping on my backpacko Fearing that I would be left 
standing in the rain due to lack of interest in anything 
but my possessions, I spoke in the town-village pidgin: 
"I am lVIonara!" This was apparently so patently absurd to 
them that it caused quite a stir all around the compound. 
After some discussion among the older observers, 
presumably concerning who would "have" me, and indeed 
whether I was worth having at all, I was led·off to the 
far segment of the circle by two teenage boys--with 
machetes drawn. 
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They indicated that I should sit, and facing me an 
older man sat as wella I squared my shoulders and 
repeated: "I am Monara!" . The man grinned broadly and 
said "Karane woni kopaia," then "Semane ia monaketa wa?"--
"Perhaps a child," then "Do you have any tobacco?" My 
education had beguna 
Commentary 
Here then we begin, with passing in its ideal formo 
Our hero is learning to be "human" once again, this time 
taking notes, Certainly, there will be gaps in his 
knowledge (in inverse proportion to the time and effort he 
puts into becoming a lVIonara), but knowledge of something 
as complex as a society--or a single human being--is never 
complete. Furthermore, whatever "abbreviations" we choose 
to use in our research, we must choose in full awareness 
of what we may lose as well as what we stand to gain. 
Relationships 
Kaneiro told me something interesting one day: 
Thirty-seven years ago, a large minority of the village 
headed southwest after bitter and prolonged disagreements 
with the majority over tree rights. Some 20 to 25 miles 
away, they made camp and established their own village. 
Since then, the village has repopulated itself and, indeed, 
Kaneiro fears it is becoming again so crowded that tempers 
flare ever more frequentlyo He says that, in the "old 
days," the village had been more careful about the number 
of children born each year (the "birth control device," 
I fear, being infanticide). 
I asked him why they did not expand the village 
circle, or build new circles nearby. With the tools they 
had traded for they had already substantially increased 
the harvest from the surrounding fruit-tree forests, as 
well as raised the fresh meat quota significantly. 
He seemed surprised at my ignorance. He explained: 
"If you are two people, you have one naikam (reciprocal 
kinship relationship). If you are four people, you have 
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six naikami, and they might further ally two against two 
or three against one. The more people in the village, the 
more difficult it becomes to assure proper behavior in all 
circumstances." 
I asked him why, then, his village didn't split more 
often, perhaps even breaking into small groups of five or 
ten people apiece? "Because," he answered, "there would 
then be no village. The village is .not the people, though 
they are necessary to it; The village is the naikami. 
If you have no nephews, you cannot be an uncle; If you 
have no village, how can you be a man? 
Commentary 
Although hardly a simple sum, the behavior of a 
collection of individuals depends on these individuals. 
This is not to say, however·, that the differences between 
a group and a society is one of sheer numbers: In a dyad, 
we have two people anp one relationship; In a society, the 
relationships so far outnumber the individuals that the 
"illusion" of the transcendent existence of the society 
beyond the individuals which compose it arises. "Illusion" 
is used very loosely indeed, and should remain in 
quotation marks: This "illusion" is dealt with by 
individuals as quite real, as is brutally exemplified by 
warring nations, castes, and races, and more pleasantly 
by the families and communities which help to define the 
individual's existence. 
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Between the dyad and the society come various other 
human organizations. Harmonious functioning of an 
organization depends on the degree to which the members of 
that organization share a common grammar of interactions 
(what social psychologists have been pleased to call roles, 
responsibilities, status, norms, modes of access, etco). 
Harmonious integration of an individual into that 
organization depends further on the degree to which that 
individual's personal patterns are compatable with the 
patterns that others expect him to exhibit. 
Father 
I knew that "father" in lVIonaram isn't the same as 
"father" in English: It includes, for example, your 
father's brothers; And it involves different obligations 
and rights in relation to the son or daughter. But I 
made a mistake in assuming that "father" was a single, 
concrete role that one enters upon having a child. 1 A 
father is one's immediately senior kinsman. This entails, 
automatically, the passing-on of ancestral relations and 
right of' inheritance. It also prescribes the duties of 
providing for the child without expecting reciprocationo 
There are other things a father usually does which I had 
thought to be part of the role as well, exceptions being 
just that: exceptions. For example, responsibility for 
1This section on the components of fatherhood, 
including the example of' an exception, is adapted from 
Keesing (1970). 
the child in cases involving compensation for damage done 
by the child, as well as control over the marriage of a 
girl child, appeared to be a father's lot .. Another area 
of fatherly concern is in the household: discipline, 
labor arrangements, and additional sustenance for which 
he could demand repayment, 
But there are many exceptions: A child who has lost 
his father may be adopted by an uncle, who takes 
responsibility as head of the household, yet the child 
may be legally represented by another relative. Or a 
child with a living father may be disciplined by his 
grandfather, 
My discomfort with these exceptions was resolved 
when I investigated one such case in detail. When a 
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young girl, Kemala, lost her father, she was taken in by a 
distant relative named Omai. As head of the household, 
he took care of her sustenance, work, discipline, and so 
on, as well as the more tender fatherly duties. Another, 
closer kinsman, Talu, acted as her guardian in legal 
matters. She left Omai's household when he approached 
her sexually, and later married, Her bridewealth was 
distributed among her immediate relatives by Talu--but 
Omai received nothing. Omai sued Talu for recompensation 
for his care of Kemala, and Talu came back with a suit 
demanding recompensation for the sexual insult to his ward, 
Each wound up paying the other an approximately equal 
amount. 
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Here is the key: Omai felt that, since he had 
adopted the fatherly role, he should be considered her 
immediate relative. Because of the insult, Kemala refused 
to recognize him as such, considering him the head of the 
household only. This, however, made her liable for 
repayment of the sustenance Omai had provided. There are 
three separate components to "father" which, though 
usually taken-up by one individual, may be distributed, 
as circumstances dictate, among two or three relatives, 
Some time later, I asked Talu whether all these 
rules for behaving properly with others didn't stifle 
spontaneity and make their lives dull and predictable. 
"Hardly!" he answered, "Although I can rely on my brother 
to be a brother to me, and a father to his children and 
a son to his parents, I cannot tell what he shall do with 
his day. Knowing the rules of a game doesn't make it too 
dull to play!" 
Commentary 
As a theory of individual differences, "glass beads" 
generates neither a trait nor a type theory. The infinite 
potential cognitive structures (not to mention their 
constant interaction with the infinite potential variations 
of situation) cannot be laid out along preconceived 
dimensions; Neither is it terribly useful to talk of 
categories when these categories include but an individual 
apiece. 
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But, culture is essentially those patterns shared by 
most (if not all) of its members, and a culture is defined 
by the decisions one needs to make in order to pass as a 
member of that cultureo Just so, categories and dimensions 
of personality are constructs developed by the culture, 
society, and individuals concerned, and are defined by the 
decisions one needs to make in order to pass as an 
individual so described. Four observations from an 
exceptional article by Keesing (1970) expand on this 
conception: 
(a) Children learning their culture--like 
ethnographers learning someone else's--learn 
the typical and standardized patterns first, 
and gradually learn the exceptions to "rules of 
thumb" and "ideal roles," 
(b) Our consciousness of "role playing" 
is largely confined, first, to the typical 
labeled composite "positions" of our culture, 
and second, to positions of higher levels of 
taxonomic hierarchies (like "physician"). · 
Intuitively we apparently perceive the lower-
level implicit "positions" as patterns of acts 
(like giving the bride away) rather than 
capacities in which we act. 
(c) The composite "positions" in which we 
ourselves and those close to us habitually 
interact become particularily standardized in 
our conceptual world. But each of us also 
continually encounters alters who represent 
Unfamiliar or unlikely composites, and we must 
behave appropriately toward them. 
(d) Since only the low-level "position" 
elements in these composites have invariant 
behavioral entailments--that is the way we 
identified them--we either must pay serious 
attention to them descriptively or abandon the 
assumption that occupying a position entails a 
predictable role (Keesing, 1970, p. 433), 
.5.5 
· The Chief's Son 
Here's an.interesting children's tale: 
"Moglala, the chief's son, wished to marry. His 
father arranged with his friend, the chief of a neighboring 
village, that Moglala meet each of his three daughters, to 
see which he would prefer. Moglala said 'I am always 
pleased with myself, and have spent many hunting trips 
alone and never suffered for lack of company. Give me 
the one most like myself, s6 that we need never disagree.' 
So the two chiefs left him with the oldest daughter, Naru, 
who was most like him. 
"Well, the first day they spent joyfully recounting 
what they liked and disliked, and agreed at every point. 
The next day, they delighted each other by saying the same 
things at the same time, By the end of the week, however, 
they both sat quietly in opposite corners of the hut. 
Because each was so like the other'· they had nothing left 
to say. Each knew the other so well that they spent the 
time as profitably thinking to themselves as talking to 
each other. 
"Moglala went back to his father and said 'Naru will 
never do. I see now that never disagreeing is very dull 
indeed. Give me instead, father,· the one least like 
myself, so that we may always surprise each other and talk 
of many different things.' So his father and the other 
chief left him with the middle daughter, Kelam, who was 
least like Moglala. 
"The first day they told each other stories that 
neither had ever dreamed. And the next day they invented 
a game where each must never do what the other expected, 
But by the end of the week, they both sat in opposite 
corners, glaring at each other: They were so different 
that one often spoke of things the other didn't care for, 
and frequently broke into argument, often over minor 
things •. 
"lVloglala returned to his father's hut in despair. 
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He said,· 'Father, I fear I shall never find a wife and 
marry. I have been with a woman very like myself, and was 
bored. I have been with a woman very different from 
myself, and was angry. If I could not be happy with either 
of these two, certainly I could not be happy with~ 
woman, as she must be a combination of both, and so both 
bore me and anger me!' His father .suggested that Moglala 
try once more, with the youngest sister, Gani. 
"Now Gani, knowing of her sisters' failures with the 
chief's son Moglala, saw little chance for herself. On 
the first day, Gani and lVloglala spoke some: Sometimes 
they bored each other; sometimes they angered each other. 
The second day went much the same way, and lVloglala 
wondered whether he should return to his father, for 
certainly such a mediocre beginning would go nowhere. 
"But he remained, and found, to his surprise, that 
during the days that followed, they sometimes agreed, 
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sometimes disagreed, and often enjoyed happy conversation. 
He saw that, as the fruit grows best when the trees are 
neither too far from each other nor too near, so will two 
people be happiest when they grow nr:i ther too distant nor 
too close. So he returned to his f;.tther and announced that 
he and Gani would marry." 
Commentary 
Irritation and pleasure were dofined as the 
experiential aspects of ineffectual interaction and the 
increase of cognitive organization respectively. The 
frequency and degree to which any individual experiences 
irritation or pleasure (of the cognitive sort) depends 
upon his structure and his situation and, of course, their 
interaction. When two individuals interact, the scheme 
becomes complicated indeed: The degree to which continued 
interaction is more pleasant than irritating for either 
person is determined by the degree to which the other 
provides for continued increase of cognitive organization 
without overly straining the ability to anticipate and 
adapt effectively. This applies as well to an individual's 
relationships with such social complexities as a job: A 
certain amount of "irritation" --Le. challenge--must be 
present for the individual to gain pleasure in resolving 
that challenge, given that one is not plagued by the more 
demanding irritations of basic human needs (a la Maslow) 
and that the challenge is within the powers of that person 
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to resolve. 
The reader may find this commentary a common-place, 
and indeed one finds discussions of "growth in marriage," 
"leaving spaces in your love," and "the golden mean of job 
satisfaction" in the advice columns of any number of 
tabloids. The reader might ask himself, however, if it 
is not a valuable achievement for a social-psychological 
world-view to be able to comfortably accommodate the 
common-place. 
Blessed Resolutions 
There are three or four degani or "double-souled" 
men in or near the village. One of these, Parenamenam, 
is especially interesting in that the villagers are 
particularily aware of the aetiology of his degani-ness. 
As I have indicated before, the Monara have a rather 
different conception of incest than we do: A child's 
riddle goes "Where grows the sweetest grass?--below your 
sister's belly!" Rather than being considered naturally 
repugnant, incest is for the Monara something each must 
fight continually against. The participants in an 
incestuous relationship essentially enter into a number 
of conflicting "roles" in reference to their own familYa 
which has the more real effect of depriving them of a 
means of interacting socially with their family at all. 
In most cases, the woman remains with the family in a 
slave-like status (makaira), where the resolution of 
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conflicting roles consists of adoption of the lowest female 
role--complete lack of status. This has a functional 
similarity to the retreat of some young women into convents 
as a response to social indiscretions, as was common in 
medieval and early modern Europe. The makaira greets any 
family member by falling on the ground with arms and legs 
tucked tightly beneath her. There are two such makairi 
living in the village. The male participants, however, 
cannot adopt this course as it only adds one further 
conflicting role component--"femaleness." In most cases. 
the man simply runs away. The intensity of the conflict is 
perhaps indicated by the fact that, in the three cases the 
villagers could recall, two were found within a month of 
leaving, dead from self-neglect. 
Parenamenam, then, commited incest with his father's 
older brother's son's daughter (enaira, "sister"), who was 
as well his ward. Just to give a bare indication of the 
conflict of role-comp9nents, he would have been obliged 
to retain the joking-relationship with his brothers while 
at the same time adopting the formal relationship, wherein 
joking is a cause for family vendettas, of the potential 
brother-in-law. This aside, Parenamenam, when confronted 
by his male relatives, responded not with any of the many 
conflicting greetings (any one of which would -have been 
insulting), but with the spontaneous behaviors of the 
degana: If one responds to a social situation with a 
behavioral episode not used in social situations, one is, 
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by definition, non-human (akaimonara), and may be suffered 
to remain at camp, or killed at the family's discretion. 
The trick to remaining "double-souled" is to never, under 
any circumstance, behave in a socially grammatical manner. 
To do so would indicate to others that you are again 
monara and so accountable for insult. 
Parenamenam, along with the other degani, fills a 
niche in the Monara village by providing a source of 
amusement for both children and adults, imitating monkeys, 
chickens, and so on, as well as presenting surprising, 
totally inappropriate human actions, such as breaking 
wind upon receiving a gift of food. Other than being 
rather ill fed (he lives on handouts and garbage) and very 
dirty, he appears to be in good health. The curandero will 
not attempt to aid him or the others: Degani-ness is 
considered a "blessed" resolution of such deviations as 
incest. 
Commentary 
The violation of general social interaction rules by 
certain individuals is "irritating" to those--the ''general 
public"--who accept these rules. The irritation may be 
dealt with in a number of ways, depending on the culture, 
society, and individuals involved, including removing the 
offender (ostracizing, imprisoning, or killing), changing 
the offender (treating, beating, or silencing), and making 
an institution of the offender (as shaman or clown). All 
of these methods are accompanied by an attempt to find a 
place for such people in the shared structures of the 
community, usually by labeling the offender. The label 
may be based on the rules which have been broken (e.g. 
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11 adulterer") 1 the means by which they were broken ( e, g, 
"sodomite"), the means used to resolve the situation (e.g. 
"prisoner"), the assumed aetiology of the offense (e.g. 
"deranged"), or most likely a combination of all of the 
above. A review can be found in King (1979), 
To speak of labels and roles in this manner has an 
unfortunate side effect: It begins to look as if the 
individuals carrying such labels as "mentally ill" or 
"antisocial" are simply wearing masks, put on by society 
or by themselves--personas devoid of affect. But you will 
recall that the -irritations of poor anticipations can rise 
to terror, and that anticipations can conflict with each 
other as well as with the outside world. For example, 
leading to (or deriving from) a label of mentally ill may 
be a desire to both leave and stay at home, or a conflict 
between your image of yourself and what others communicate 
to you, or an incongruence between the "rational" and 
"affective" aspects of your interaction. But the range 
of affective experience of those labeled as mentally ill is 
the same as the range "permitted" those who are not. 
A Problem of Semantics 
Since the Monara spend half their lives swinging in 
their hammocks, I decided to check their understanding of 
pendulums. As expected, they were well aware of the 
relationship of frequency to the length of the string. 
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But I was quite surprised when they all insisted that 
pendulums with heavier weights were faster than those with 
lighter weights! I proceeded to "educate" my friends by 
demonstrating patiently how, given a specific length of 
string, the speed is a function of only the height of the 
arc. They agreed, as long as I stuck to one weight, but 
persisted in their belief, so I demonstrated again with 
different weights, with the results I had anticipated. 
·But they insisted that I was mistaken! I became somewhat 
excited and began yelling "Can't you see it? Can't you 
~?" At this, Balorum struck me hard in the chest and 
said, "Can't you feel?" 
It dawned on me that this was a "communications" 
problem. So I explained my conception of speed to them, 
in terms of how many heartbeats it takes to get from the 
entrance of the village to the far segment. After some 
discussion among themselves, Balorum spoke: "If a water 
buffalo took five heartbeats to cross the commons and a 
bee took five minutes, which would you prefer to stand in 
front of?" With this I understood what he had meant when 
he asked if I could feel. They have a conception of 
distance, but not of small, fixed intervals less concrete 
than heartbeats, hence no speed. Likewise, they apparently 
did not extract speed from their concept of force: One 
man's arrows do not go faster than another's; he has a 
better draw. 
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Discussing this further with Balorum and his brothers, 
I began to realize that even weight was thought of in terms 
of force: Since all objects "want" to fall, holding a 
stone is the same as stopping a stone from continuing on 
a trajectory it "wants" to take. When a stone falls from 
a height, well, obviously it increasingly wants to get to 
the earth, i.e. it accelerates! This sounded vaguely like 
a lecture I had heard some years ago on relativity. But 
whether Einstein would agree or not, this revelation went 
some way towards correcting my usage of the word ugalam, 
which I had assumed meant both speed and weight. I no 
longer commented on the great "weight" of resting rocks, 
nor on the enormous "speed" of the local mosquitos! I 
suppose that, living in a rather thick rain forest, people 
here had little opportunity to track things over long 
distances, the sort of thing that makes speed obvious. On 
the other hand, falling objects and surprise collisions 
with frightened animals are quite common. 
Commentary 
The reader will recall, back in the section on 
language, I distinguished between the "mechanical 
translation system" of semantic knowledge, with its neat 
little taxonomies and rigid little rule systems, and our 
"experiential" knowledge, strung out in inefficient 
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narrative ·nets. The first may be thought of as the 
individual's version of philosophy, science, logic, and 
mathematics, the second as history. The point is that an 
individual's beliefs, a commoner 1 s common sense, an 
esoteric culture's folk science, and a scientist's well-
developed science are all of the same cloth: They are all 
attempts at expanding our semantics by way of experience 
in order to reduce the irritations of the unexpected. 
This formulation of knowledge has also been the basis 
of much research into cognitive development. Development 
consists of new structures built upon old structures when 
old structures fail to perform {learning), as well as the 
growth of innate structures (maturation), and the 
interaction of the two. Inasmuch as most learning occurs 
in small pieces, we expect growth to be a cumulative, 
long-term process. But, as this is a qualitative theory, 
learning does not follow the elegant curves of the 
statistician, and indeed one small piece of new knowledge 
may be just the one to allow the structure to fall 
together into what appears to be a wholly new orientation. 
Baron (1973) has made a very similar suggestion, using 
componential anlysis as an alternative to Piaget's and 
Kohlberg's stage theoriesa 
The Curandero 
Two men ran into the curandero's hut bearing a young 
woman between them, A snake had entered the compound and 
she had had the misfortune of stepping on it. The old man 
had them lay her on his cot and set straight to his work: 
Happily, his first step was to suck at the wound. After 
each draw, he spat the blood and venom into a small stone 
cup. After some five minutes at this arduous task, he 
stopped, examined the wound, and reached for a leather bag· 
suspended from the roof near his cot, He applied an 
ointment from the bag and bound the wound tightly with. a 
woven grass bandage. I assumed that this was the end of 
the matter ·and that he would send them home with the woman 
with a prescription of roots and rest, But instead, he 
bent over the feverish woman's ear and whispered, "What 
sin did you commit?" The woman moaned and began to cry. 
By then, some thirty people, family and friends, had 
gathered around the curandero and his patient. He struck 
her feet with a small but sturdy stick. Again, he demanded 
to know her sin. At last, she spoke out: "I stole my 
sister's taro!" The Qurandero shouted some unintelligible 
phrase, spilled the contents of the stone cup on the 
ground, and.told her that she could rest. She collapsed 
into sleep. 
I spoke with the curandero the following day, and 
asked him why he had treated the woman so. He asked me 
why I thought the snake had bitten her. I was non-plussed 
when I realized that there was no word for chance in their 
language. The old man explained that the snake's bite 
allowed her to confess a sin that he knew had troubled her 
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for many months. Without this opportunity, he felt that 
she would have slowly deteriorated from the withheld evil. 
The snake saw fit to punish her and so allow her to be 
well. As the ancient Greek sophist used his rhetoric to 
allow others to come to his conclusions by themselves, so 
the curandero saw the meaps for her to cure herself of 
guilt in a snake's bite! I was appropriately grateful for 
his teaching and left him a chicken in paymento 
Commentary . 
. We might conceive of teaching as "applied passing:" 
Discover how others think and how you would convince 
yourself if you thought as they do, and then proceed to 
convince them. In therapy, we might present the patient 
with an image of himself so that he may be aware of himself 
more fully; Further, we might "become" the patient and 
carry on a "monolog" with him, directing his thinking with 
his own logic, providing little more than the "motivation" 
which comes easier to the outsider. Even in dealing with 
the physical world, we might educate ourselves by the 
"practical animism" of becoming the problem. 
Although oriented to understanding, this thesis does 
not rule out prediction and control: Rather, it 
acknowledges the complexity of human experience and so 
avoids presenting those in authority with easy solutions 
to their problems. The theory implies that, in order to 
predict and control people effectively, you must be in 
control of a large number of variables and know more about 
the relationships of these variable than your subjects. 
As Neisser suggested (1976), the chess master beats me 
because he knows more about chess, not because he knows 
more about psychology, 
We may also find a form of prediction and control, 
requiring less offensive differentials in power, in 
education. The original sense of the word involved 
educing, persuading, seducing, arranging that others come 
to your conclusions by their own logical processes, and the 
ethics of this are far from pristineo But education as the 
providing of alternatives differs essentially from 
prediction and control in their more authoritarian modes 
by stipulating that the steps in your direction are freely 
takeno Remember that this paper has allowed for will as 
the ability to separate our internal image-making from 
environmental goings-on: In honest education, the 
individual, when presented with the information, may at 
any time say no. 
Endings 
When I prepared to leave with the next trading 
expedition from the town down-stream, I had been with the 
Monara eighteen months, the last five as a Monara: Padam, 
the old man who first spoke with me, had taken me into the 
Taro clan as his adopted son. This was done in 
consultation with the various family headmen, who 
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evaluated my education and concluded that I was now capable 
of behaving as a kinsman without unduly insulting them. I 
was going to miss them, and I left with a promise to return 
in five years, if I could. 
With the expedition had come my brother and his wife. 
I ran to them, hugged them, and rapped them on their 
shoulders. A look .of consternation on their faces 
momentarily upset me, but my joy at seeing them put it out 
of my mind. Only later did they explain: What they had 
seen running down the dock in bare feet was a wiry brown 
man wearing nothing but a loin wrap and hair pasted back 
with red mud. They had not immediately recognized this 
Monara tribesman as their brother. 
Concluding Remarks 
How can we reconcile Piaget's developmental work 
with behavior modification, Freudian defenses with 
information-processing models of cognition, split-brain 
research with theories of motivation, existential dilemmas 
with industrial psychology, social psychology with day-to-
day life? This paper is a step towards finding the "deep 
structure" underlying these diverse surface manifestations, 
a step towards providing a context within which these and 
other aspects of the sciences of human experience may 
find integrity" 
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APPENDIX 
As a great deal of this thesis draws on areas that 
may not be familiar to social psychologists, I would like 
to append here a brief list of readings. While hardly 
exhaustive on any of the topics, the books and articles 
listed will provide, I believe, excellent summarizations of 
and introductions to these esoteric fields. 
Structuralism 
Structuralism is a fairly recent European 
philosophical basis for research into human experience. 
The most thorough explication is Jean Piaget's 
Structuralism (1970), and further illumination can be found 
in his Genetic Epistemology (1970). The. other name most 
closely associated with structuralism is that of 
Claude Levi-Strauss. His views are slightly different 
from Piaget's (as fits his different area of interest) and 
are best summarized in Structural Anthropology (1963). 
Selections by these and other structuralists can be found 
in Lane (1970), and comparisons between Piaget and 
Levi-Strauss in Gardner's The Quest for Mind (1973). 
Chomsky and most modern linguists and linguistic 
anthropologists are also usually considered structuralists, 
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and I would argue that a number of psychological viewpoints 
are unwittingly structuralist, such as Neisser's 




The roots of componential analysis go back to Chomsky 
{see 1965), but are more clearly seen in Katz's concept of 
semantic tags. He thoroughly develops his ideas in 
Semantic Theory (1972)0 Actual development as an 
anthropological technique first occurred independently in 
Goodenough (1956) and Lounsbury (1956). An excellent 
overview of the place of componential analysis in the 
larger area of ethnography can be found in Goodenough's 
Description and Comparison in Cultural Anthropology (1970). 
A nice collection of early uses of the technique is 
Hammel's special edition of American Anthropologist (1965). 
Finally, a lonely article by Baron (1973) suggests 
reinterpreting Piaget and Kohlberg in componential terms. 
Ethnoscience 
In 1964, American Anthropologist put out a special 
edition called Transcultural Studies in Cognition, edited 
by Romney and D1 Andrade. It was essentially a "coming-out 
party" for ethnoscience, including the perhaps defining 
article by Sturtevant (1964). James Spradley offers a 
book of readings (1972) and, with McCurdy (1972), a very 
77 
readable examination of the use of ethnoscience in our own 
cultureo Finally, a contrast and comparison is included 
in Psathas' Phenomenological Sociology (1973). 
Stratificational Linguistics 
Stratificational linguistics made its appearance 
when Sidney Lamb sought to reconcile "traditional" modern 
linguistics (e.g. Chomsky) with some thoughts of 
Louis Hjelmslev (1961). First, he saw that 
transformations could be reduced to structure in such a 
way that we could represent all of language in terms of 
relations. Second, he saw that Chomsky's three layer 
system, with the emphasis of the centrality of syntax, 
would have to give way to a multi-layer system operating 
in both directionso As this school has developed 
rapidly, I suggest that the reader look at Makkai and 
Lockwood's book of readings (1973) for theory and 
examples, and at Lockwood's Introduction.to 
Stratificational Linguistics (1972) for an explication 
of the notation, as well as Lamb's original works (1964, 
1965, 1966a, 1966b). For a view of the breadth of this 
approach, see Ikegami's "A Stratificational Analysis of 
Hand Gestures in Indian Classical Dancing" (1971). 
Componential analysis, ethnoscience, and 
stratificational linguistics find a nearly complete 
resolution in the works of Geoffrey Leech on semantics 
(1969, 1970, 1974, and Leech and Pepicello, 1972). 
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Apparently working independently of the 
stratificationalists, he acknowledges that Ikegami's The 
Semological Structure of English Verbs of Motion (1969) is 
compatible with his own system. I recommend Leech's 
Semantics (1974) to anyone. 
Qualitative Methods 
Anthropologists, apparently an eminently practical 
group, have been using qualitative methods since they first 
arrived, without much fuss as to their theoretical import 
or epistemological validity. Although one may start 
anywhere, I suggest Naroll and Cohen's Handbook of Method 
in Cultural Anthropology (1970). 
Sociologists are, apparently, rarely practical, but 
seem to have excellent philosophical backgrounds with 
which to justify their techniques. Three schools have 
things to say: 
1. Symbolic Interactionism. Based.essentially on 
G. H. Mead (1934), Blumer is their best spokesman--see his 
Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (1969), 
Also, see Filstead's Qualitative Methodology, a set of 
essentially Meadian articles. 
2. Dramaturgy. Although some suggest that this is a 
theory, I suggest it is a method based loosely on Burke 
(1945 and 1950), and outstandingly used by Goffman (1959, 
1961, and 1969). 
3. Ethnomethodology. This derives from Garfinkle's 
79 
fascinating work on "ordinary living" (1962 and 1967), and 
is excellently expanded upon in Mehan and Wood's The 
Reality of Ethnomethodology (1975), 
Finally, psychologists have simply tended to ignore 
qualitative methods as somehow inferior. A fine line 
between the qualitative and the quantitative has been 
walked by Piagetian and Freudian "clinical interviewing" 
techniques, and by the naturalistic observation techniques 
used by Sherif and otherso The outstanding exception to 
the polite acknowledgement of quantity can be seen in some 
existentialist research. The best explication of research 
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